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This discussion document deals with three key concepts 
associated with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and 
its relation to the public, namely accountability, public 
interest and trust. It is presented that for the NPA to be 
regarded as a legitimate institution it needs to enjoy trust and 
in order to enjoy such trust, it needs to be seen and perceived 
to act in the public interest in an accountable manner. 
 
Accountability 
The Constitution requires, amongst others, that the public 
administration must be accountable
1
 and this is further 
reflected in the Public Service Charter as a ‘commitment by 
public servants’.
2
 Corder, Jagwanth and Soltau describe 
accountability in the general sense as follows:  
Accountability can be said to require a person to explain 
and justify – against criteria of some kind – their 
decisions or actions. It also requires that the person 
goes on to make amends for any fault or error and takes 
steps to prevent its recurrence in the future.
3
 
In relation to prosecutors, independence without 
accountability ‘poses an obvious danger to the public interest, 
which requires the fair and just administration of the criminal 
justice system’.
4
 While prosecutorial independence is an 
essential element in the proper administration of justice, it 
must be recognised that inherent in independence without 
accountability is the potential for making ‘arbitrary, capricious, 
and unjust decisions’.
5
 It also creates a real risk of corruption 
at the highest level.
6
 Events surrounding the NPA over the past 
ten years has increasingly shown an institution loathe to any 
form of accountability and clearly having been manipulated by 




Given the tension between constitutional imperatives and the 
NPA’s considerable discretion, the accountability of the NPA 
needs to be enhanced, while at the same time maintaining its 
necessary independence of office. The central issue is thus the 
question of balancing independence with oversight and 
accountability; imbalances in this regard have led to the 
various problems afflicting the NPA. These were concisely 
identified in research done already in 2007: 
[S]everal serious challenges still remain, including: poor 
court performance, a growing backlog of cases, low 
prosecution rates, growing numbers of sentenced 
prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial, the need to 
maintain positive public perceptions, clarifying the role 
and positioning of its elite crime fighting unit, the 
Directorate of Special Operations, allegations of 
criminality among its own members, high staff turnover, 
and the need to deal with the consequences of complex 




Effective accountability relies on three principles, namely 
transparency, answerability, and controllability. In a 
constitutional democracy the public service must function in a 
transparent manner. It means that officials have a duty to act 
visibly, predictably and understandably.
9
 Nothing must be 
hidden from public scrutiny, especially when human rights and 
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governance concerns are at stake. The actions of officials must 
be predictable as guided by policy, legislation, regulations, 
standing orders and good practice. The actions and decisions 
of officials must be motivated, rational and justifiable. It needs 
to be known what officials are doing, and when asked, they 
must be able to provide an understandable and predictable 
answer. However, without knowing what officials are doing 
and how decisions are made, accountability is impossible: 
there can be no accountability without information.
10
  
Decision-makers must also be able to justify their decisions 
and actions publicly in order to substantiate that they are 
reasonable, rational and within their mandate – they must 
therefore be answerable.  Transparency and answerability will 
have little meaning if there are not mechanisms in place to 
sanction actions and decisions in contravention of the given 
mandate; accountability institutions (e.g. Parliament) must 
therefore be able to exercise control over the institutions that 
they are overseeing.  Failure to hold government and 




As noted in the above, independence without accountability 
‘poses an obvious danger to the public interest’. The notion of 
public interest requires further exploration since the NPA is 
central to the rule of law
11
 and holds the monopoly on the 
power to institute criminal proceedings,
12
 save for when 
private prosecutions are undertaken
13
 There is an expectation 
that the NPA will act in the public interest (i.e. for the greater 
good) by fulfilling its mandate. Even when difficult to define, 
‘public interest serves as the fundamental criterion for 
establishing the legitimation of power. Political power, then, is 
legitimate and necessary, and even acceptable, only inasmuch 
as it can be established that it serves public interest.’
14
 This 
legitimising function is dependent on trust, namely the trust 
that the public has that political power (i.e. in the form of the 
NPA) will be used in the public interest; conversely if the NPA is 
not trusted by the public to act in its interest, it delegitimises 
the NPA.  
The NPA is not only given extraordinary powers to prosecute 
but is furthermore protected by the Constitution that it must 
exercise these powers without fear, favour or prejudice.
15
 The 
NPA will only be, in broad terms, regarded as legitimate if it is 
seen, perceived and trusted to exercise its vast powers in a 
manner that is in the public interest and indeed without fear, 
favour or prejudice. Its powers are indeed vast if it is kept in 
mind that the NPA can institute proceedings against individuals 
as well as corporations and members of associations,
16
 and 
that assets can be frozen and forfeited on a balance of 
probabilities.
17
 The NPA is also, in respect of certain serious 
offences, not restricted by time either as these offences do not 
prescribe after 20 years.
18
 Not even a sitting president is 
immune from prosecution, should the NPA decide to institute 
such a prosecution.
19
 The ‘public’ in ‘public interest’ therefore 
includes, but is not limited to, individual victims of property 
and violent crime we see in our courts every day, but also 
victims of criminal corporations, the tax payer who suffers 
losses due to state corruption, the victims of apartheid, and 
the electorate whose chosen leaders engage in corrupt 
activities. In short, on the one hand, every citizen has in one 
way or the other a stake in how the NPA makes decisions and 
the results of those decisions, and on the other hand, there is 
little, if anything, hindering the NPA in prosecuting prima facie 
cases and investigating allegations to determine their 
substance. The extent to which the NPA can establish overlap 
between public interest and successful and meaningful 
prosecutions will determine its legitimacy and the level of trust 
it enjoys.  
Under the heading “Prosecution in the public interest” the NPA 
Prosecution Policy sets out three broad considerations with 
regard to the issue prefaced by “a prosecution should normally 
follow, unless public interest demands otherwise” and it is 
necessary to cite it here in full: 
The nature and seriousness of the offence: 
• The seriousness of the offence, taking into account the 
effect of the crime on the victim, the manner in which it 
was committed, the motivation for the act and the 
relationship between the accused person and the victim.  
• The nature of the offence, its prevalence and recurrence, 
and its effect on public order and morale. 
• The impact of the offence on the community, its threat to 
people or damage to public property, and its effect on the 
peace of mind and sense of security of the public. 
• The likely outcome, in the event of a conviction, having 
regard to sentencing options available to the court. 
The interests of the victim and the broader community: 
• The attitude of the victim of the offence towards a 
prosecution and the potential effects of discontinuing it. 
Care must be taken when considering this factor, since 
public interest may demand that certain crimes should be 
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prosecuted - regardless of whether or not a complainant 
wishes to proceed. 
• The need for individual and general deterrence, and the 
necessity of maintaining public confidence in the criminal 
justice system. 
• Prosecution priorities as determined from time to time, 
the likely length and expense of a trial and whether or not 
a prosecution would be deemed counter-productive. 
The circumstances of the offender: 
• The previous convictions of the accused person, his or her 
criminal history, background, culpability and personal 
circumstances, as well as other mitigating or aggravating 
factors. 
• Whether or not the accused person has admitted guilt, 
shown repentance, made restitution or expressed a 
willingness to co-operate with the authorities in the 
investigation or prosecution of others. (In this regard the 
degree of culpability of the accused person and the 
extent to which reliable evidence from the said accused 
person is considered necessary to secure a conviction 
against others will be crucial). 
• Whether the objectives of criminal justice would be 
better served by implementing non-criminal alternatives 
to prosecution. 
• Whether there has been an unreasonably long delay 
between the date when the crime was committed, the 
date on which the prosecution was instituted and the trial 
date, taking into account the complexity of the offence 
and the role of the accused person in the delay.
20
 
The Prosecution Policy seems to pin public interest down to a 
finite list and this seems to be at odds with thinking from 
elsewhere. The first issue is that the guidelines in the 
Prosecution Policy do not seem to be alive to the broader 
substantive issues, such as South Africans’ experience of crime, 
but rather individualises decisions to prosecute or not with 
reference to the offence, the offender and the victim. There 
then seems to be a disjuncture between how the Prosecution 
Policy interprets public interest compared to, for example, the 
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court have dealt with 
a range of issues brought by public interest litigants, such as 
the rights of the homeless, refugees, prisoners on death row, 
prisoners generally, prisoners imprisoned for civil debt, the 
landless, gender equality, the rights of the child, the 
constitutional rights of gay men and lesbian women, and in 
relation to freedom of expression.
21
 The jurisprudence from 
the Constitutional Court shows the open-ended nature of the 
notion of public interest and its link to constitutional rights, 
especially where it concerns vulnerable groups. This 
understanding of public interest does not seem to surface in 
the Prosecution Policy. One may indeed argue that if the 
Prosecution Policy should contain guidelines on prosecutions 
in the public interest, then priorities should be the prosecution 
of corrupt politicians and government officials, prosecutors 
who cause harm to victims through negligence,
22
 and law 
enforcement officials implicated in human rights violations, to 
name a few. Based on crime trends and those crimes instilling 
the most public fear one may similarly add other priority areas. 
In short, what one would consider to be in the public interest is 
not reflected in the Prosecution Policy and what is reflected 
provide little substantive guidance. 
Secondly, the question arises whether public interest can be 
defined, and is it even desirable to attempt to define it? The 
Australian Law Reform Commission advises against it: “‘Public 
interest’ should not be defined, but a list of public interest 
matters could be set out in the new Act. The list would not be 
exhaustive, but may provide the parties and the court with 
useful guidance, making the cause of action more certain and 
predictable in scope. This may in turn reduce litigation.”
23
 
The Australian Federal Court gave further insight into the 
complexities and that an open mind must be maintained:  
The public interest is not one homogenous undivided 
concept.  It will often be multi-faceted and the 
decision-maker will have to consider and evaluate the 
relative weight of these facets before reaching a final 
conclusion as to where the public interest 
resides.  This ultimate evaluation of the public interest 
will involve a determination of what are the relevant 
facets of the public interest that are competing and 
the comparative importance that ought to be given to 
them so that “the public interest” can be ascertained 
and served.  In some circumstances, one or more 
considerations will be of such overriding significance 
that they will prevail over all others.  In other 
circumstances, the competing considerations will be 




Whilst it seems that public interest should not be a closed list, 
there are certain requirements that those claiming to act in the 
public interests must comply with, or of whom it is expected to 
act in the public interest. Acting in the public interest has two 
separate components. Firstly, objectives and outcomes - the 
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objectives and outcomes of the decision-making process are in 
the public interest. Secondly, the process and procedure, 
noting that the process adopted and procedures followed by 
decision-makers in exercising their discretionary powers are in 
the public interest, which would include: 
• Complying with applicable law (both its letter and spirit) 
• Carrying out functions fairly and impartially, with integrity 
and professionalism 
• Complying with the principles of procedural 
fairness/natural justice 
• Acting reasonably 
• Ensuring proper accountability and transparency 
• Exposing corrupt conduct or serious maladministration 
• Avoiding or properly managing situations where their 
private interests conflict or might reasonably be 
perceived to conflict with the impartial fulfilment of their 
official duties, and 
• Acting apolitically in the performance of their official 
functions (not applicable to elected public officials).
25
 
Succinctly put, “‘The public interest’ is best seen as the 
objective of, or the approach to be adopted, in decision-
making rather than a specific and immutable outcome to be 
achieved.  The meaning of the term, or the approach indicated 
by the use of the term, is to direct consideration and action 
away from private, personal, parochial or partisan interests 
towards matters of broader (i.e. more ‘public’) concern.”
26
  
Working in the public interest then seems to be as much about 
procedure as it is about outcome. South African courts have 
recognised that procedure is important and that it is in the 
public interest to decide on specific issues.
27
 Without 
predetermining the outcome, the courts recognise that dealing 
with an issue is or itself in the public interest. Not making 
decisions when one is mandated to make decisions works 
against public interest and there are few better examples than 
the NPA not making decisions on 686 cases referred to it since 
2013 by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU).
28
 Similarly in 
2016/17 Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) 
referred 1140 cases to the NPA and was awaiting feed-back on 
97% of them.
29
 It is in the broader public interest that serious 
criminal cases are prosecuted and that police officials who are 
implicated in criminal activities, especially human rights 
violations, are prosecuted. Criminal cases are also diverted on 
a significant scale by the NPA through mediation and given the 
scale on which this happens, serious questions must be posed 
about the ‘public interest’ of this practice. In 2016/17 there 
were some 340 000 verdict cases and 164 000 cases handled 
through mediation and thus no prosecution, representing 32% 
of total cases finalised.
30
 More detailed information on the 
profile of these cases are not available. While the NPA’s 
conviction rate has been on a steady increase (latest is 96%), 
the number of prosecutions has declined and the available 
data indicates that it is unlikely that serious, dangerous and 
prolific offenders are prosecuted.
31
 Given current crime trends, 
it seems at least suspicious that nearly a third of criminal cases 
are dealt with through mediation and this undermines public 
expectations regarding the prosecution of criminal suspects. It 
is thus required to look more closely at how the NPA defines 
public interest and if current policy and practice is indeed 
serving the public interest. 
 
Trust 
Trust can be described as ‘the belief, despite uncertainty, that 
something you believe should be done will be done and the 
belief, despite uncertainty, that something you believe should 
not be done, will not be done, the outcome of which will be 
beneficial to you or another’.
32
 Taking a broader perspective, 
trust in an institution is at least partly reliant on the 
behavioural conduct of that institution.
33
 Trust in the police, 
for example, therefore, is to some degree a function of 
perceptions of police conduct
34
 and the same would then 
apply to the NPA. 
Trust is not simply a state of mind of an individual, but rather 
involves a consequence associated with some kind of risk to 
one’s ultimate welfare. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary 
defines trust as “assured reliance on the character, ability, 
strength, or truth of someone or something” with synonyms 
being confidence, credence, faith, and stock. In addition, trust 
and confidence both imply a feeling of security. Trust also 
implies instinctive unquestioning belief in and reliance upon 
someone or something like a group to which one belongs or a 
public institution established to protect citizens.
35
 Levi and 
Stoker define trust as relational in nature, and argue that ‘it 
involves an individual making herself vulnerable to another 
individual, group, or institution that has the capacity to do her 
harm or to betray her.’
36
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Figure 1 How much do you trust each of the following, or 
haven’t you heard enough about them to say? (% who say 
“somewhat” or “a lot”)
37
 
Importantly, trust can be measured, as shown in Figure 1, and 
the situation does not reflect well on the NPA, nor the courts 
or SAPS. Figure 1 presents the results in Afrobarometer surveys 
to the question ‘How much do you trust each of the following, 
or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?’ giving the 
combined percentage of responses indicating “somewhat” or 
“a lot”. From 2006 to 2015 this proportion of responses 
declined from 65% to 55%, but the most substantial decline 
was in respect of the courts – declining from 69% top 57%; a 
decrease of 12 percentage points. The NPA can hardly 
disassociate itself from the courts and public levels of trust will 
undoubtedly be informed by their experiences in and at the 
courts. Some 30% of respondents indicated that they don’t 
trust at all or trust the NPA very little. In respect of the courts, 
this figure was 41%.  
 
The overwhelming impression gained is then that fewer and 
fewer South Africans, from 2006 up to 2015, held the view that 
the NPA (and the police and courts) acted in the public interest 
and from this it then follows that the NPA enjoys declining 
legitimacy. While high profile cases may shape respondents’ 
views (e.g. the Zuma prosecution or lack thereof), it cannot 
negate peoples’ real lived experiences of the NPA and the 
criminal justice system.  
 
Conclusion 
Three concepts were discussed in the above, being 
accountability, public interest and trust. All three have bearing 
on the legitimacy of state institutions and how political power 
is used. The ultimate result being sought is a high appreciation 
of the legitimacy of the NPA, but that can only occur if there is 
trust in the NPA that it will act in the best possible public 
interest. Such trust will be shaped by the extent to which the 
NPA conducts itself as an accountable institution of state, i.e. 
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